Refining how the term ‘Icon’ is conceived as a Step towards Nomothetic Descriptions of Behavioral-Ecological Events
The term icon is ubiquitous. For example, in linguistics iconicity is conceived as the relationship between speech acts and meaning whereas in semiotics broadly, iconicity is conceived as a grounded relationship between an icon and its referent. While these examples may be easier to reconcile than not, fresh confusion has been introduced by Hoffman, Manish, and Chetan’s (2015) ‘Interface Theory of Perception’ (ITP) within perceptual science. The ITP also invokes icons as a foundational component. But are Hoffman and et al.’s ‘icons’ the same as semiotic ‘icons’? If not, can these two definitions of ‘icon’ be reconciled? Taking their cue from von Uexküll, the ITP posits that all biological organisms interact with the world via a species-specific user interface similar to a computer. The ITP builds on a theoretical assumption that perception did not evolve to represent reality as it is, but rather to represent reality as it is useful to an organism thus maximizing fitness function. Consequently, perceptual structures simplify reality to order and discriminate information and quell choice paralysis. Continuing with the computer analogy, the ITP proposes that what organisms see as external objects are no different from computer icons. Icons in this way hide the complexity of a computer’s hardware and software and provide users units of interaction that are functional. Following Deely’s view that icons represent the first contact between sense perceptions and reality that generate initial qualitative experiences, and Hoffmeyer’s description of iconic and indexical scaffolding, we hope to show that the ITP icon and semiotic icon are one and the same. Providing some conceptual clarity for the term icon is important to minimize confusion amongst interested scholars. While potentially enriching, a plurality of understanding can create challenges for interdisciplinary collaboration where the same analytical terms may be invoked with reference to a problem or event, but understood differently by the parties involved.
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References
Hoffmeyer, J. (2015). Introduction: semiotic scaffolding. Biosemiotics, 8(2), 153-158.
Hoffman, D.D., Singh, M. and Prakash, C. (2015). The interface theory of perception. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 22(6), pp.1480-1506.
Lockwood, G. and Dingemanse, M. (2015). Iconicity in the lab: A review of behavioral, developmental, and neuroimaging research into sound-symbolism. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, p.1246.